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Abstract
We define and analyze an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination in order to estab-
lish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent
influenza epidemics. We find that epidemics are rarely prevented. We also find that severe epidemics
may occur without the introduction of pandemic strains. We further address the situation where market
incentives are introduced to help ameliorating epidemics. Surprisingly, we find that vaccinating families
exacerbates epidemics. However, a public health program requesting prepayment of vaccinations may
significantly ameliorate influenza epidemics.
Game theory has been very successful to help design economic market strategies. Recently, game theory
has been applied in the field of theoretical epidemiology. Deductive reasoning games have been used to price
vaccines [16] and to predict the voluntary vaccination coverage (i.e., the proportion of the population that
gets vaccinated) for pathogens that provide permanent immunity (smallpox and measles) [5, 4]. However,
applying deductive reasoning may be limited [3] because it requires that individuals share the same perception
of risk of infection and vaccination adverse effects. For pathogens that provide permanent immunity, using
deductive reasoning games is still justified since individuals need to get vaccinated only once. However, in
the case of pathogens that do not provide permanent immunity (e.g., influenza), individuals need to make
vaccination decisions every year. It may be assumed that individuals make vaccination decisions based
on their past experiences (i.e., use inductive reasoning) rather than based only on the current influenza
epidemiology (i.e., use deductive reasoning). Here we present and analyze for the first time several inductive
reasoning games that may apply to influenza vaccination.
The first inductive reasoning model was introduced in 1994 with the El Farol bar problem [3]. We now
briefly present this problem as a paradigm for inductive reasoning games. Consider a group of N individuals
acting in their own self-interest. Each week, every individual independently decides whether or not to go to
the El Farol bar. An individual deems it worth going if fewer than a critical fraction of the total number of
individuals N are present. Otherwise, the bar is crowded and the individual would rather stay at home. No
individual knows the bar attendance in advance, nor do they communicate with others; thus, the decision of
going to the bar cannot be made in a logical deductive fashion. Instead, an individual would predict/guess
the bar attendance and base their decisions on these predictions. Once the bar attendance is known, an
individual evaluates and adapts their predictions for future decisions. This continuous adaptation of one’s
behavior based on expectations about future collective behavior is called inductive reasoning and applies
in many instances where logical deductive reasoning fails either in principle or due to bounded rationality
[3]. Inductive reasoning games have been applied to financial markets where traders decide to buy or sell a
certain asset whose price is determined by their collective action [8, 22, 9, 7]. For example, in a market with
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more buyers than sellers it is rewarding to be in the minority of sellers to benefit from a higher price of the
asset. Such games have been called Minority Games [8, 22, 9, 7].
We note that there are striking similarities between the El Farol bar problem and the dynamics of the
market of voluntary vaccination against pathogens that do not induce permanent immunity. For concreteness
of discussion, we consider influenza vaccination. The influenza vaccine is effective for one year only, thus
individuals must decide every year whether to vaccinate or not [25]. It may be assumed that individuals
act in their own self-interest trying to avoid infection preferably without having to vaccinate. The yearly
vaccination coverage (i.e., the proportion of the population vaccinated each year) is determined by the
collective participation of the individuals. Compartmental models of disease transmission [15, 10, 17] have
shown that there exists a critical coverage level such that: if the coverage is below the critical level, an
epidemic will occur, otherwise epidemics will be prevented. However, whether or not a vaccination coverage
larger than the critical level is likely to be reached every year in a voluntary vaccination market is a question
that we address here for the first time. Indeed, inductive reasoning games provide a very suitable modeling
background for approaching this question. We construct a inductive reasoning game of influenza vaccination
based on the analogy between the situation at hand and the El Farol bar problem. The critical vaccination
coverage will play the role of the critical attendance fraction (i.e., crowding threshold). Individuals that go
to the bar correspond to individuals that vaccinate. Individuals that stay at home correspond to individuals
that do not vaccinate. For the bar problem: individuals would go to the bar for entertainment, but if the
bar is crowded, they would rather stay at home. For the vaccination game: individuals would vaccinate to
avoid infection, but if the coverage is larger than the critical level, they no longer need to vaccinate to avoid
infection. However, there are also distinctions between the two games. When an individual does not vaccinate
and the critical coverage is not reached, they still have a non-zero probability of avoiding infection due to
peer vaccination (i.e., they are protected by herd immunity). In contrast, for the bar problem, an individual
always regrets not going to the bar if the critical attendance is not reached. We construct an individual-level
model that describes the adaptive dynamics of vaccination decisions in a population of non-communicating
individuals acting in their own self-interest (i.e., selfish). Our model tracks both individual-level vaccination
decisions and behavior as well as the resulting population-level variables such as influenza prevalence and
vaccination coverage levels.
From the public health point of view, our work has important consequences [27]. In the United States,
influenza vaccination is voluntary and the demand for influenza vaccines (70 to 75 million vaccine doses per
season) is generally met. The vaccine is very effective in offering protection [6]. However, due to evolution
of the virus and waning immunity, the vaccine is good only for one influenza season. In recent years, the
vaccination coverage has steadily increased [18, 2]. Even so, every year, up to 25% of the United States
population is infected with influenza [25] causing 36,000 deaths [2, 26]. One of the national health objectives
of the United States is to further increase the vaccination coverage [18, 2] which currently is below the
Healthy People 2010 objective [19]. Therefore, it is important to understand the vaccination dynamics and
what incentives could be used to increase the vaccination coverage in order to control the epidemic.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In sections 1 we introduce and briefly analyze our individual-level
vaccination model with no public health program (basic model). Our strategy is to derive a dynamical system
for the expectations of the variables of the model. Then, we address deviations from this mean-field limit
by adding small gaussian noise to the dynamical systems. Using the same approach, in section 2 we discuss
analytical results regarding the basic model with superimposed vaccination incentives which results into two
public health programs. Our analysis helps explain the coverage dynamics observed in direct numerical
simulations of the model.
2
1 Basic Model
1.1 Description
Deterministic models of disease transmission based on ordinary differential equations [15, 10, 17] have shown
that there exists a critical coverage level such that: if the coverage is below the critical level, an epidemic
will occur, otherwise epidemics will be prevented. Our inductive games include a simple model of this
coverage threshold1. We denote the coverage by P , the critical coverage by pc, and the probability of getting
infected by q. We consider that if P < pc, then q(P ) decreases linearly with P , otherwise q(P ) = 0. This
model is consistent with the fact that unvaccinated individuals benefit from herd immunity. Also, it is in
qualitative agreement with more sophisticated results from the analysis of the Susceptible-Infected-Recoved
(SIR) model; see Appendix A2. The qualitative nature of the results that we describe in this article does not
depend on the details of q(P ). They only depend on the fact that q(P ) is strictly monotonically decreasing
for P < pc and 0 for P ≥ pc. We now present the assumptions that define our first inductive reasoning game
which we refer to as the basic model.
1. We consider a number N of individuals that every year make vaccination decisions. They are assumed
to act in their own interest and not to communicate their decisions to each other. The sole interest of
the individuals is to avoid getting infected, preferably without getting vaccinated.
2. To make their vaccination decisions, each individual uses their past experiences of vaccination outcomes.
Thus, individuals independently decide whether or not to vaccinate using inductive reasoning.
3. An individual remembers and weights their previous vaccination outcomes with respect to their present
vaccination outcome. A parameter s discounts the previous year vaccination outcome with respect to
the outcome of the present year (0 ≤ s < 1). For s = 0, individuals completely ignore the outcome of
previous seasons and, as a consequence, do not use inductive reasoning. If s were equal to 1, individuals
would not discount the previous vaccination seasons; therefore, the vaccination outcome of the present
season is as important as any of the previous seasons.
4. We define a vaccination decision as a Bernoulli variable χ
(i)
n with parameter w
(i)
n that depends on
a variable V
(i)
n . i and n are positive integers; i = 1, 2, ..., N labels the individual and n > 0 labels
the seasons. If individual i decided to get vaccinated in season n then χ
(i)
n = 1, otherwise χ
(i)
n = 0.
w
(i)
n is the probability that individual i vaccinates in season n. The variable V
(i)
n characterizes the
pro-vaccination experience of the ith individual (see details in assumption (7)) and determines w
(i)
n .
The domains of the variables are as follow: χ
(i)
n ∈ {0, 1}, w
(i)
n ∈ [0, 1], and V
(i)
n ∈ [0, 1/(1− s)).
5. In year n, a set Xn of N vaccination decisions is made: Xn = {χ
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. Our inductive
reasoning game is an array (Xn) where {χ
(i)
n , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} determine {V
(i)
n+1; 1 ≤ i ≤ N} which further
determine {w
(i)
n+1; 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, the parameters of the Bernoulli variables {χ
(i)
n+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} in year
(n+ 1).
6. The infection event of individual i in year n is a Bernoulli variable η
(i)
n with parameter q(Pn), where
Pn =
∑N
i=1 χ
(i)
n /N is the coverage achieved that year. If individual i got infected in season n then
η
(i)
n = 1, otherwise η
(i)
n = 0.
1We do not include the option of treatment. However, the effects of treatment can be implicitly included in our model by
decreasing the effective critical vaccination coverage pc.
2Our model is designed to describe a large population of selfish non-communicative individuals. Thus, we account only for
the occurrence of epidemics and we do not consider outbreaks. Outbreaks become decreasingly important as the population
size N increases.
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7. Xn = {χ
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and {η
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N} determine V
(i)
n+1 as follows (see Fig. 1). We have four
cases: (a1) if χ
(i)
n = 1 and pc ≤ Pn, then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n ; that is, if individual i gets vaccinated in
season n and no epidemic occurs, then the individual considers the vaccination unnecessary; (a2) if
χ
(i)
n = 1 and Pn < pc, then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + 1; which means that if individual i vaccinates in season n
and an epidemic occurs, then the individual considers the vaccination necessary; (b1) if χ
(i)
n = 0 and
η
(i)
n = 1 then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + 1; that is, if individual i does not get vaccinated in season n and gets
infected, then the individual considers the vaccination necessary; and (b2) if χ
(i)
n = 0 and η
(i)
n = 0 then
V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n ; which means that if individual i get vaccinated in season n and they do not get infected,
then the individual considers the vaccination unnecessary.
8. The probability that an individual chooses to get vaccinated is updated as follows
w
(i)
n+1 = V
(i)
n+1/[(s
n+1 − 1)/(s− 1)]. (1)
That is, an individual’s probability to get vaccinated in the next season is given by the updated
cumulative vaccination experience. We have normalized V
(i)
n+1 by (s
n+1− 1)/(s− 1) because this factor
is the maximum possible value for V
(i)
n+1 if individual i would have benefited from vaccination in all of
the n influenza seasons.
We consider initial conditions that assign a random vaccination probability for the first season to every
individual. Specifically, V
(i)
0 = 0 and w
(i) is uniformly random between 0 and 1. Our initial conditions
are chosen to reflect the fact that the initial public awareness of the benefits of the influenza vaccination
is not high enough to prevent an epidemic, while at the individual-level the likelihood of vaccination may
vary considerably. Figure 2 shows numerics obtained by simulating the basic model. Our analysis aims to
provide an understanding of the coverage dynamics in Fig. 2. As p approaches pc from below, it eventually
fluctuates above pc, then abruptly drops below pc, and the dynamics repeats.
1.2 Analysis
We first present an analysis of our featured model in the limit of large population. Then, we discuss
asymptotic aspects of the model that apply as the population is large, yet finite. We proceed with the
derivation of a one-dimensional iterated map in the variable p denoting the average of w(i) over the entire
population. Note that w
(i)
n = E(χ
(i)
n ), pn = E(Pn) =
∑N
i=1 w
(i)
n /N , and E(q(P )) = q(p) where by E() we
denote expectation. Following the tree in Fig. 1 which describes the four cases of vaccination evaluation, we
obtain
branch expected population fraction V (i) update
(a1,2) pn V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + 1− θ(pn − pc);
(b1) (1− pn)q(pn) V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + 1;
(b2) (1− pn)[1− q(pn)] V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n ;
(2)
where θ(x) is the unit step function defined as
θ(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 0;
0, if x < 0;
(3)
and q(p), the probability of an unvaccinated individual getting infected with influenza is given by
q(p) =
{
0, if p ≥ pc;
−p q(0)/pc + q(0), if p < pc.
(4)
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Taking the weighted average over Eqs. (2), we obtain
vn+1 = svn + (1− pn)q(pn) + pn[1− θ(pn − pc)], (5)
where v denotes the average of V (i) over the entire population. Taking the population average over Eqs. (1),
we get
pn+1 = (1− s)vn+1/(1− s
n+1). (6)
Combining Eqs. (5) and (6), we describe the dynamics of the vaccination coverage at the population level in
the limit of infinite population, without regards to the individual-level processes
pn+1 =
s(1− sn)
1− sn+1
pn +
1− s
1− sn+1
{(1− pn)q(pn) + pn[1− θ(pn − pc)]}. (7)
Our dynamical system is defined on the unit interval I = [0, 1].
1.2.1 Fixed Point Analysis
The fixed points of our map are determined by the following autonomous asymptotic form obtained from
Eq. (7) as n→∞
pn+1 = spn + (1 − s){(1− pn)q(pn) + pn[1− θ(pn − pc)]}. (8)
Due to the discontinuities at p = pc, we distinguish two complementary domains: I1 = [pc, 1] and I2 = [0, pc).
Case 1: I1. Equation (8) becomes the following linear dynamical system
pn+1 = spn. (9)
The above dynamical system has no attractors in I1. However, if we extend the domain to I, then the
system has a fixed point at p∗ = 0 which is a global attractor that belongs to I2. This fully characterizes
the dynamics in I1: orbits in I1 will be attracted to 0 until they land in I2. In I2 the orbit is iterated with
a different smooth map.
Case 2: I2. We now obtain the following nonlinear dynamical system
pn+1 = pn + (1− s)(1− pn)(−pn q(0)/pc + q(0)), (10)
that has no fixed points in I2. However, if we extend the domain to I, then the system has two fixed points:
p˜ = 1 and pˆ = pc. The derivative of the map evaluated at p˜ is 1 + q(0)(1− s)(p
−1
c − 1) > 1; thus, this fixed
point is unstable for all the parameter values. pˆ is a potential attractor of the system since the derivative
of the map evaluated at pˆ is 1 − q(0)(1 − s)(p−1c − 1) with range (−∞, 1]. It is important to note that pˆ
lies on the boundary between I1 and I2. Thus, even though pˆ does not belong to I2, pˆ attracts orbits with
initial conditions in I2. That is, the basin of attraction of pˆ intersects I2. Assuming that pˆ is an attractor
and derivative of the map at pˆ is nonnegative, orbits that start in I2 are immediately attracted from below
to pˆ, but never reach this fixed point. They only get arbitrarily close to it, always remaining in I2. Orbits
that start in I1 are initially attracted to p
∗ = 0 but once they land in I2 they are attracted to pˆ. For
the parameters of the numerics presented in Fig. 2, pˆ is an attractor and the derivative of the map at pˆ is
nonnegative.
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1.2.2 Bifurcation Diagram
With varying pc and/or s and/or q(0), a rich dynamical behavior is observed for our iterated map. As
expected in piecewise smooth systems, we observe border-collision bifurcations [23, 11, 14, 20, 24, 13, 12]. A
bifurcation diagram for s = 0.7, q(0) = 0.8 and varying pc is presented in Fig. 3. With decreasing pc, the
derivative of the map at pˆ, 1− (1− s)[q(0)(p−1c − 1)], becomes zero at pc = {1+1/[(1− s)q(0)]}
−1 ≈ 0.2. At
this critical pc value, a border collision bifurcation takes place and a stable periodic orbit is created in phase
space. Approaching pˆ for pc < {1 + 1/[(1− s)q(0)]}
−1, an orbit in I2 will land in I1 since the derivative of
the map at pˆ is negative. The smooth map that applies to the I1 domain [Eq. (9)] will send the orbit back
in I2, and, eventually, a stable period two orbit is created. With further decreasing pc, pˆ becomes unstable
at pc = {1 + 2/[(1− s)q(0)]}
−1 ≈ 0.1 and the period two orbit undergoes period doubling. At low values of
pc, chaotic behavior is numerically observed.
1.2.3 Effects at Large Finite N
We now discuss several aspects of the dynamics that occur because the number of individuals N is in fact
finite, albeit large. These aspects are transparent in our direct simulations of the game and the above fixed
point analysis is insufficient to explain the results in Fig. 2.
From the point of view of the mean field analysis, the case of large finite N can be described by adding
small amplitude gaussian noise to the mean field map. In most of the phase space the noise does not change
the qualitative dynamics of the orbit. However, the situation becomes critically different as the noisy orbit
asymptotically approaches pˆ from I2. Due to the noise (i.e., stochasticity in the mean field due to the finite
number of individuals), p may jump above (but close to) pˆ. According to Eq. (9), in the next iteration the
orbit lands in I2 in the vicinity of spc, far from pˆ = pc; see Fig. 2. Then, the orbit is attracted again to
pˆ and undergoes a similar scenario in an apparently periodic dynamics. This phenomenon may be called
noise induced border-collision bifurcation since the presence of arbitrarily small noise transforms an orbit
asymptotically approaching pˆ into an orbit that is expected to be periodic. We note that this sensitivity of
the mean field of the basic model to arbitrary small noise makes the simulation of the mean field of the basic
model difficult since rounding noise cannot be avoided in numerics.
The expected periodicity depends on the number of individuals in the ensemble and can be estimated as
follows. Close to pˆ, the dynamics of p can be approximated as pˆ− pn ∼ λ
n, where λ is the derivative of the
map at pˆ; for the parameter values used in Fig. 2, λ = 1− (1− s)[q(0)(p−1c − 1)] ≈ 0.84. Denoting N
v
n and Nˆ
the numbers of individuals that vaccinate in season n and the number of individuals that would vaccinate
at equilibrium, the previous relation can be written as Nˆ −Nvn ∼ λ
nN . We expect a jump of the coverage p
above pˆ when Nˆ −Nvn ∼ Nˆ
1/2 which is the order of the fluctuations in Nvn . Denoting n˜ the expected period
of the dynamics, we obtain the following scaling result at large finite N
n˜ ∼ −
log(Npc)
2 logλ
, (11)
which we have successfully verified through numerics (not shown).
2 Models with Public Health Programs
The basic model predicts that epidemics are not prevented. Furthermore, severe epidemics are periodically
expected. We explore two possible public health strategies that may ameliorate epidemics. Thus, we intro-
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duce two additional inductive reasoning games in order to evaluate the potential effects of the following two
public health programs applied to the basic model:
• Program 1: If the head of the family (HF) pays to get vaccinated then their family will get vaccinated
for free.
• Program 2: If an individual pays to get vaccinated then that individual will get free vaccinations for
a specified number of successive years.
We follow our previous strategy, deriving and analyzing mean-field approximations. Then, we discuss first
order deviations from the mean-field exploring the effects of superimposed small noise.
2.1 Public Health Program 1
2.1.1 Model Description
We consider that the population of N individuals is now divided into F groups representing families. Each
family contains C members and one individual in each family acts as its head. The public health program
offers free vaccination to a family if the head of that family paid for his/her vaccination. Only the heads
of the family make vaccination decisions and they track the vaccination experience for all of their family
members; see Fig. 4. It is very important to note that, as a consequence of this public health program, the
vaccination coverage of the heads of families equals the population-level vaccination coverage. We specify
the model using a set of eight assumptions.
1. We consider a number of F = N/C HF that every year make vaccination decisions. They are assumed
to act in the interest of their own families (including themselves) and not to communicate their decisions
to each other. The sole interest of the HF is to protect their family members from infection, preferably
without getting anyone vaccinated.
2. To make their vaccination decisions, each HF uses inductive reasoning.
3. A parameter s discounts the HF’s previous year vaccination outcome with respect to the outcome of
the present year (0 ≤ s < 1).
4. A vaccination decision is a Bernoulli variable χ
(i)
n with parameter w
(i)
n that depends on a variable V
(i)
n .
i and n are positive integers; i = 1, 2, ..., F labels the HF and n > 0 labels the seasons. If HF i decided
to vaccinate in season n then their family also gets vaccinated and χ
(i)
n = 1; otherwise, χ
(i)
n = 0.
w
(i)
n is the probability that HF i vaccinates in season n. V
(i)
n is the pro-vaccination experience of the
family of HF i (see assumption (7)) and determines w
(i)
n . The domains of the variables are as follow:
χ
(i)
n ∈ {0, 1}, w
(i)
n ∈ [0, 1], and V
(i)
n ∈ [0, C/(1− s)).
5. In year n, a set Xn of F vaccination decisions is made: Xn = {χ
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ F}. Our inductive
reasoning game is an array (Xn) where {χ
(i)
n , 1 ≤ i ≤ F} determine {V
(i)
n+1; 1 ≤ i ≤ F} which further
determine {w
(i)
n+1; 1 ≤ i ≤ F}, the parameters of the Bernoulli variables {χ
(i)
n+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ F} in year
(n+ 1).
6. The infection event of individual j (j = 1, ..., N ; i.e., the individual may or may not be HF) in year
n is a Bernoulli variable η
(j)
n with parameter q(Pn), where Pn =
∑F
i=1 χ
(i)
n /F is the coverage achieved
that year. If individual j got infected in season n then η
(j)
n = 1, otherwise, η
(j)
n = 0.
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7. Xn = {χ
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ F} and {η
(i)
n ; 1 ≤ i ≤ F} determine V
(i)
n+1 as follows (see Fig. 1). We have C + 3
cases: (a1) if χ
(i)
n = 1 and pc ≤ Pn, then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n ; that is, if HF i gets their family (including
themselves) vaccinated in season n and no epidemic occurs, then the HF considers the vaccination
unnecessary; (a2) if χ
(i)
n = 1 and Pn < pc, then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n +C; which means that if HF i gets their
family (including themselves) vaccinated in season n and an epidemic occurs, then the HF considers the
vaccination necessary for all the family members; (bk) if χ
(i)
n = 0 and k family members (k = 0, ..., C)
have η
(ji)
n = 1 (where ji = 0, ..., C labels the family members of the ith family), then V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n +k;
that is, if HF i does not get vaccinated in season n and k members of their family (including themselves)
get infected, then the HF adjusts his pro-vaccination experience by accounting for their infected family
members.
8. The probability that an HF chooses to vaccinate is updated as follows
w
(i)
n+1 = V
(i)
n+1/[C(s
n+1 − 1)/(s− 1)]. (12)
That is, an HF’s probability to get vaccinated in the next season is given by updated cumulative
vaccination experience. We have normalized V
(i)
n+1 by C(s
n+1 − 1)/(s − 1) because this factor is the
maximum possible value for V
(i)
n+1 if HF i and their family would have benefited from vaccination in
all of the n influenza seasons.
Figure 5A shows numerics obtained by simulating the model with the first public health program. We note
that the coverage drops below pc more often, and thus the first public health program appears detrimental to
ameliorating epidemics. Our analysis aims to provide an understanding of the coverage dynamics in Fig. 5A.
2.1.2 Model Analysis
Following the HF evaluation tree shown in Fig. 4 we obtain
branch expected population fraction V (i) update
(a1,2) pn V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + C[1 − θ(pn − pc)];
(bk) (1− pn)Qk(pn) V
(i)
n+1 = sV
(i)
n + k;
(13)
where Qk(p) is the probability that k members get infected with influenza in an unvaccinated family when
the expected coverage is p. The probability that a single individual gets infected in a season with expected
coverage p is q(p). Assuming mass-action infection dynamics [21], the probability that k members of a family
get infected is binomial
Qk(pn) =
C!
k!(C − k)!
q(p)k [1− q(p)]C−k . (14)
We now present mean-field equations for our model with the first public health program. Substituting
Eq. (14) into Eq. (13) and averaging over all branches we obtain
vn+1 = svn + Cpn[1− θ(pn − pc)] + Cq(pn)(1− pn). (15)
Averaging over Eq. (12) we obtain
pn+1 = vn+1/[C(s
n+1 − 1)/(s− 1)]. (16)
The fixed point analysis of the above dynamical system follows similarly to that of the basic model
and yields similar results. As in the case of the basic model, pˆ = pc plays a crucial role in determining
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the dynamics. The derivative of the coverage map at pˆ is the same as in the basic model. The expected
periodicity formula is similar to that found for the basic model [Eq. (11)]. In this case the number of
HF (F = N/C) determines the periodicity instead of the total number of individuals (N). Therefore, the
periodicity as a function of the family size C can be expressed as
n˜(C) ∼ −
log(Fpc)
2 logλ
, (17)
where for C = 1 we recover Eq. (11). We now compare the expected periodicity of major epidemics for
C > 1 to that for C = 1 (i.e., basic model). We use the same values of s, pc and q(0) such that orbits in
both models approach pˆ from I1. The ratio of the expected periodicities is given by
n˜(C)/n˜(1) ∼
[
1−
logC
log(Npc)
]
< 1. (18)
Hence, the first public health program increases the frequency of major influenza epidemics and decreases
the time average of the coverage.
2.2 Public Health Program 2
2.2.1 Model Description
An individual who pays to enter the second public health program receives influenza vaccination for the
current year and for y number of successive years. Although individuals enrolled in the program do not
make vaccination decisions, they consider the necessity of vaccination every year. At the end of the free
vaccination period, they use their evaluations to decide whether to pay for another enrollment. The model
can be formally described by a number of eight assumptions. In particular, we use assumptions (1) through
(7) of the basic model. Assumption (8) is the following.
(8) The probability that an individual gets vaccinated is updated as
w
(i)
n+1 = V
(i)
n+1/[(s
n+1 − 1)/(s− 1)], (19)
unless χ
(i)
n = 1; i.e., the individual vaccinated in season n. In this later case, w
(i)
n+r = 1 for 0 < r ≤ y,
and, in season (n+ y + 1),
w
(i)
n+y+1 = V
(i)
n+y+1/[(s
n+y+1 − 1)/(s− 1)]. (20)
That is, after vaccinating in season n, and taking advantage of y seasons of free vaccination, the
individual resumes his adaptive behavior in season (n+ y + 1).
Figure 5B shows numerics obtained by simulating the model with the second public health program. We
note a qualitative change in the orbit of p; thus, the second public health program can potentially ameliorate
epidemics. Our analysis aims to provide an understanding of the coverage dynamics in Fig. 5B.
2.2.2 Model Analysis
We now introduce notation to describe the analysis of the model. We use the superscript r to specify the
individual-level parameters for individuals that have r vaccinations left. N rn (0 ≤ r ≤ y) denotes the number
of individuals that have r vaccination years left in season n;
∑y
r=0N
r
n = N . The ratio between the number
of individuals with r vaccination years that vaccinate in season n and N rn is denoted by pi
r
n. Since we assume
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that all individuals complete the free vaccination program, pirn = 1 if r > 0. The population-level coverage
can be written as
pn =
1
N
y∑
r=0
N rnpi
r
n. (21)
Given pi0n we can write a dynamical system for N
r
n
N0n+1 = N
1
n + (1− pi
0
n)N
0
n,
N rn+1 = N
r+1
n ; for 0 < r < y, (22)
Nyn+1 = pi
0
nN
0
n.
The number of individuals that will decide to enroll in the program next year (N0n+1) is given by the
individuals that will finish their vaccination program (N1n) and the individuals that did not enroll in the
vaccination program this year ((1− pi0n)N
0
n). The number of individuals with r (0 < r < y) years left in the
program next year (N rn+1) is given by the number of individuals with r + 1 years left in the program this
year. The number of individuals with y years left in the program next year (Nyn+1) is given by the number
of individuals that enroll in the vaccination program this year (pi0nN
0
n).
The vaccination behavior of the individuals enrolled in the vaccination program is simple: they vaccinate
every year
wr (i)n = 1. (23)
However, they evaluate the necessity of vaccination updating their pro-vaccination variable V depending on
whether or not there was an influenza epidemic each year
V
r (i)
n+1 = sV
r (i)
n + 1− θ(pn − pc). (24)
The individuals that are not enrolled in the vaccination program need to decide whether or not to vaccinate.
The individual-level probabilities to vaccinate get updated as in the basic model
w
0 (i)
n+1 = V
0 (i)
n+1 /[(s
n+1 − 1)/(s− 1)]. (25)
The evaluation of the vaccination decisions is the same as in the basic model; see Fig. 1. Following the
evaluation tree in Fig. 1 we obtain
branch population fraction V 0 (i) update
(a1,2) pi0n V
0 (i)
n+1 = sV
0 (i)
n + 1− θ(pn − pc);
(b1) (1− pi0n)q(pn) V
0 (i)
n+1 = sV
0 (i)
n + 1;
(b2) (1− pi0n)(1 − q(pn)) V
0 (i)
n+1 = sV
0 (i)
n .
(26)
We now present mean-field equations for our model with the second public health program. Dividing
Eqs. (23) by N we get a set of equations for ηrn = N
r
n/N which are intensive quantities. Following the
technique in Sec. 2, we average over the individuals to obtain the mean-field variables. We arrive to the
following dynamical system
η0n+1 = η
1
n + (1 − pi
0
n)η
0
n, (27)
ηrn+1 = η
r+1
n ; for 0 < r < y, (28)
ηyn+1 = pi
0
nη
0
n, (29)
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v0n+1 = sv
0
n + (1− pi
0
n)q(pn) + pi
0
n[1− θ(pn − pc)], (30)
vrn+1 = sv
r
n + 1− θ(pn − pc); for 0 < r ≤ y, (31)
pi0n+1 = (1− s)v
0
n+1/(1− s
n+1), (32)
pirn+1 = 1; for 0 < r ≤ y, (33)
where
pn ≡
y∑
r=0
ηrnpi
r
n, (34)
and
y∑
r=0
ηrn = 1. (35)
The dynamical system simplifies since the equations for vr (0 < r ≤ y) and pir (0 ≤ r ≤ y) are decoupled,
and η0 can be eliminated using the constraint (35). We thus obtain
ηrn+1 = η
r+1
n ; for 0 < r < y, (36)
ηyn+1 = v
0
n
(
1− s
1− sn
)(
1−
y∑
r=1
ηrn
)
, (37)
v0n+1 = sv
0
n +
[
1− v0n
(
1− s
1− sn
)]
q(pn) + v
0
n
(
1− s
1− sn
)
[1− θ(pn − pc)], (38)
where
pn ≡ F (η
1
n, ..., η
y
n, v
0
n) ≡ v
0
n
(
1− s
1− sn
)
+
[
1− v0n
(
1− s
1− sn
)] y∑
r=1
ηrn. (39)
We write the state of the system as (η1n, ..., η
y
n, v
0
n); the domain of the dynamical system is D = [0, 1]
y ×
[0, 1/(1− s)).
Fixed Point Analysis. Due to the discontinuities at p = pc, we distinguish two complementary domains:
D1 = {(η
1, ..., ηy, v0)|F (η1, ..., ηy, v0) ≥ pc} and D2 = {(η
1, ..., ηy, v0)|F (η1, ..., ηy, v0) < pc}.
Case 1: D1. In the limit n→∞, Eqs. (36), (37) and (38) become
ηrn+1 = η
r+1
n ; for 0 < r < y, (40)
ηyn+1 = v
0
n(1 − s)
(
1−
y∑
r=1
ηrn
)
, (41)
v0n+1 = sv
0
n, (42)
which has no attractors in D1. However, if we extend the domain to D, then the system has a fixed point
that belongs to D2 at x
∗ = (0, ..., 0). This fixed point is an attractor since the jacobian of the dynamical
system evaluated at x∗ has one eigenvalue equal to s (0 ≤ s < 1) and j eigenvalues equal to 0. This
attractor is global since v0 is decreasing, corresponds to the situation where no individual vaccinates, and
fully characterizes the dynamics in D1: orbits in D1 will be attracted to x
∗ until they land in D2. In D2, the
orbit is iterated with a different smooth map.
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Case 2: D2. We now obtain the following dynamical system
ηrn+1 = η
r+1
n ; for 0 < r < y, (43)
ηyn+1 = v
0
n(1− s)
(
1−
y∑
r=1
ηrn
)
, (44)
v0n+1 = v
0
n + [1− v
0
n(1− s)]q(pn), (45)
that has no fixed points in D2. However, if we extend the domain to D, then the system has two fixed points.
The first fixed point is x˜ = ((y + 1)−1, (y + 1)−1, ..., (y + 1)−1, (1 − s)−1) and corresponds to the situation
where everybody vaccinates (i.e., p = 1). It can be shown straightforwardly that 1 + q(0)(1 − s)(p−1c − 1)
and 1 are eigenvalues of the jacobian of the system at x˜; thus, x˜ is unstable. The second fixed point of the
extended system is xˆ = (pc/(y + 1), pc/(y + 1), ..., pc/(y + 1), pc/(1 − s)/[1 + y(1 − pc)]) corresponding to
p = pc. The fixed point may be interpreted as follows. The population of N individuals is divided into two
groups. The individuals in the first group never vaccinate while those in the second group always vaccinate.
The number of individuals that vaccinate keep the vaccination coverage p at pc every year and always have
positive experience with influenza vaccination. This implies that the ηr (0 < r ≤ y) values of xˆ are all the
same. η0 = 1−ypc/(y+1) includes both individuals that never vaccinate and individuals that just finished a
vaccination program and will enroll in a new one. The individuals who do not vaccinate do not get infected
because p = pc and always have positive experience with not vaccinating. The characteristic equation at
xˆ is analytically intractable. However, it can be established numerically that xˆ is a potential attractor of
the map defined for D2 when the domain is extended to D. For the dynamical system describing the basic
model with superimposed public health program 2 (Eqs. (36), (37), and (38)), xˆ may be attracting from D2
since xˆ is on ∂D2 and the basin of xˆ intersects D2; xˆ is asymptotically approached, yet never reached.
Bifurcation Diagram. Figure 6 presents a bifurcation diagram for y = 1, s = 0.7, q(0) = 0.8 and varying
pc. At high values of pc, the orbits are attracted to xˆ which yields p = pc. With decreasing pc, a border
collision bifurcation occurs. At a particular value of pc, a critical periodic orbit is created in phase space
which with further decreasing pc turns into a periodic attractor (see Fig. 6). Denoting the (y+1)-dimensional
map given by Eqs. (36), (37), and (38) by M , the equation of the critical orbit is
M [n](xˆ; pc) = xˆ, (46)
where by M [n] we denoted the nth iterate of the map, and the solutions must have finite n. Equation (46)
may be understood as follows. For some parameter values, xˆ is reached in a finite number of iterates. xˆ
(xˆ ∈ D1) is not a fixed point of the map M ; in particular, the next iteration of xˆ will be in D2, then the
orbit will be evolved with the smooth map that applies in D2 for a finite number of iterates until xˆ is reached
again. Equation (46) may not have solutions for all positive integers; also, there may be multiple solutions
with the same value of n. In particular, for n = 4, y = 1, s = 0.7, pc = 0.6, and q(0) = 0.8, we numerically
solve Eq. (46) and obtain pthc ≈ 0.4 which is in agreement with the numerics presented in Fig. 6. For values
of pc in the neighborhood of p
th
c (p < p
th
c ), the critical periodic orbit turns into a periodic attractor. It is
important to note that, except for p = pthc , the periodic attractor is bounded away from ∂D2, such that the
periodic attractor is robust to arbitrarily small noise. A similar analysis can be performed with varying s.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this type of border collision bifurcations is mentioned in
the literature. We numerically observe that for our model, pthc and s
th increase with y.
Discussion. The study of these border collision bifurcations is critical for understanding the effect of the
public health program 2. In practice, it would be unlikely that pc and/or s are parameters that can be easily
changed since the critical vaccination coverage pc is strongly determined by the viral strain and the memory
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parameter s is a feature of the population. On the other hand, y would be a parameter of the public health
program 2 that is easy to change. Since pthc and s
th increase with y, it is expected that, for given s, pc, and
q(0), there exists a threshold value of y (which we denote yth) such that the orbits of the dynamical system
with parameters y = yth − 1, s, pc, and q(0) are attracted to the corresponding xˆ (i.e., to p = pc) and the
orbits of the dynamical system with parameters y = yth, s, pc, and q(0) go to a non-trivial period n attractor.
For example, for s = 0.7, pc = 0.6, and q(0) = 0.8, we obtain y
th = 3 and n = 6. This phenomenon is very
important since it establishes a threshold value for the number of prepaid vaccinations such that the public
health program 2 makes a significant difference in the dynamics of the mean field coverage. Furthermore,
depending of the parameters of the system, the statistics over time of the orbit on the periodic attractor
may yield better epidemiological quantifiers that the statistics over time of the orbit attracted to pc. In this
case, the public health program 2 is effective in ameliorating the influenza epidemiology.
3 Conclusions
We introduced (for the first time) an inductive reasoning game to model whether or not the critical vaccina-
tion coverage can be reached and influenza epidemics can be prevented by voluntary vaccination in a large
population of individuals acting in their own self-interest. From our analysis, it obtained that epidemics
are only occasionally prevented. We explored two public health programs based on offering incentives in
a voluntary vaccination market. The first public health program proposed dividing the population into
families and leaving the vaccination decisions to the heads of the family. Surprisingly, this program always
exacerbated epidemics since it reduced the number of independent decision makers. The second public
health program that we analysed required prepayment of vaccinations. We found that there exist a critical
number of prepayments so that the public health program will make any difference at all for the course
of the epidemics. Once this critical number of prepayments is established and implemented, depending on
the population parameters and the epidemiological parameters, the second public health program has the
potential to ameliorate epidemics.
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Figure 1: A: A schematic diagram illustrating the evaluation tree for each selfish individual. An individual
that decides to vaccinate (branch (a)) will judge their choice depending on whether there was an epidemic
that season. If the coverage was equal or greater than the critical coverage p ≥ pc (branch (a1)), they will
conclude that their choice to get vaccinated that season was not necessary to prevent infection. Otherwise,
if the coverage was lower than the critical coverage p < pc (branch (a2)), they will conclude that their choice
was beneficial for avoiding infection that season. An individual that decides not to vaccinate that season
(branch (b)) will judge their choice based on whether they was infected. If they did get infected (branch (b1))
they will conclude that their choice of not vaccinating was detrimental and that vaccination was necessary
for avoiding infection. Instead, if by chance they avoided infection (branch (b2)), they will conclude that
vaccination was not necessary.
0 50 100 150
0.4
0.6
0.8
n (years)
p n
Figure 2: Vaccination dynamics using a memory parameter s = 0.7, a critical coverage pc = 0.6 (dashed
line) and a probability q(0) = 0.8 of getting infected when the coverage p = 0. Dynamics of yearly coverage
p for a population of N = 105 individuals. The dynamics of p is approximately cyclic: as p approaches pc
from below, it eventually fluctuates above pc and then abruptly drops below pc.
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram of the dynamical system given by Eq. (7) versus pc. s = 0.7 and the probability
of getting infected when the coverage p = 0 is q(0) = 0.8. We note that numerical noise greatly perturbs the
dynamics of our piecewise smooth map because pˆ ∈ ∂I2. To improve the numerics, we slightly modified the
map in order for pˆ ∈ I2; in turn, this slightly changes the bifurcation values of pc.
Figure 4: Schematics illustrating the evaluation tree for each head of family. An head that decides to
vaccinate themselves and their family (branch (a)) will judge their choice depending on whether there was
an epidemic that season. If the coverage was equal or greater than the critical coverage p ≥ pc (branch (a1)),
they will conclude that their choice to get vaccinated that season was not necessary to prevent infection.
Otherwise, if the coverage was lower than the critical coverage p < pc (branch (a2)), they will conclude
that their choice was beneficial for avoiding infection that season. An head that decides not to vaccinate
themselves and their family (branch (b)) will judge their choice based on how many of their family members
were infected. If k members get infected (branch (bk)), they will conclude that vaccination was necessary
only for k members of the family.
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Figure 5: Coverage dynamics (p) for different public heath programs in a population of N = 105 non-
communicating selfish individuals using a memory parameter s = 0.7, a critical coverage pc = 0.6, and a
probability q(0) = 0.8 of getting infected when the coverage p = 0. A: The head of the family makes the
decision as to whether or not their family vaccinates. The coverage dynamics when the family size is eight
(C = 8) is shown in black; the coverage dynamics when individuals make vaccination decisions independently
is shown in gray for comparison. Similar results were obtained for family sizes of two and four. B: Individuals
that pay for one vaccination are rewarded y = 3 extra years of vaccination; the coverage dynamics is shown
in black and the time averages of the epidemiological quantifiers are ameliorated. The coverage dynamics
when individuals pay for every year of vaccination is shown in gray for comparison.
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram of the dynamical system given by Eqs. (36), (37), and (38) versus pc. s = 0.7
and the probability of getting infected when the coverage p = 0 is q(0) = 0.8. We slightly modified the map
to reduce the effects of numerical noise; in turn, this slightly changes the bifurcation.
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AIn order to calculate the probability of getting infected with influenza q given a certain vaccination coverage
p during one vaccination season we make the following assumptions:
1. We ignore the inflow and outflow of individuals in the study population during a season. That is, we
ignore vital dynamics.
2. Individuals may vaccinate against influenza only before the beginning of the influenza season.
3. Vaccinated individuals are not susceptible during the next coming season.
4. Individuals who get infected and then recover remain immune to infection until the end of the season.
As a result of the above assumptions we choose to model the epidemic transmission during one season using
a SIR model without vital dynamics that includes vaccination at the beginning of each influenza season.
dS(t)/dt = −βS(t)I(t)/N,
dI(t)/dt = βS(t)I(t)/N − γI(t),
dR(t)/dt = γI(t),
dV (t)/dt = 0,
(47)
where S(t), I(t), R(t) and V (t) represent the number of susceptible, infected, recovered and vaccinated
individuals, respectively. The total number of individuals N = S(t) + I(t) + R(t) + V (t) is constant. β
represents the transmissibility in the mass-action term [21]. γ represents the recovery rate. The probability
of getting infected during an influenza season q(p) is given by
q(p) =
∫ T
0
βS(t)I(t)/N2dt, (48)
where T represents the duration of the influenza season. The initial conditions are as follows. A fraction p
of the population vaccinates against influenza leaving only (1 − p)N susceptibles. Thus, at the start of the
influenza season, S(0) = (1 − p)N − 1, I(0) = 1, R(0) = 0 and V (0) = pN . In Fig. 7 we show a illustrative
graph of q(p). We note that the featured dependence is approximately piecewise linear. The discontinuity
in derivative occurs at p = pc = 1− 1/N − γ/β which for large N becomes pc ≈ 1− γ/β [1].
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Figure 7: The probability of getting infected q(p) versus the vaccination coverage p for the SIR model with
no vital dynamics. The parameters are N = 105, β = 5/6 day−1, γ = 1/3 day−1 and T = 200 days.
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